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and Some Basic Labor Problems. Pp. xvi + 584. $3.75. Volume II,
Labor's Risk and Social Insurance. Pp. xii + 453. $3.00.
IF You can forget for a while the melodrama of local and international
politics, which makes it unlikely that the sweet reasonableness of professors will
prevail, Professor Hansen's notable collection of recent papers is reassuring
reading. And even if you are a complete pessimist about the shape of things to
come, you should find a wistful pleasure in his picture of what might be, or
what might have been, in the democratic world. For Full Recovery or Slagna-
tion? belongs with and substantially supplements the recent barrage of tracts
defending the faiths of democracy.' In most of those books the political or
moral argument for democracy is weakened by a vague fatalism about the
future of the economic system. Some lack economic analysis altogether; others
accept or advance a variant of the proposition that the capitalist economy as
we have known it is dead, and must be replaced by a regime of "planning."
In either case the pamphleteers treat the economic side of the problem of
democracy briefly and ambiguously, some without much concern for the more
authoritarian implications of the slogan of "planning." But Hansen considers
the economics of capitalism with persuasive concreteness. 2 What he says
is that our brand of capitalism has not necessarily met its day of judgment :3
it follows that praise of political democracy is not yet idle talk.
The first section of Fdl Recovcrxy or Stagnation? criticizes recent formu-
lations of trade cycle theory, and gives Hansen a chance to state his own
view of the problem, as background for the applied economics of the rest of
the book. His analysis is an effective and critical restatement of conclusions
which represent the upshot of recent work in the field.
"The essential characteristic of the business cycle," he says, is fluctuation
in the output of durable goods.4 The purchase of durable goods has been
financed in large part by the sale of securities, or by the creation of corporate
surpluses and of reserves for depreciation and obsolescence. Many factors
affect the output of capital goods, by influencing both the attractiveness of
1. See, e.g., AGAR, THE Puasurr or HA,'PrNEss; CouN-rs, TnE Pnoszcrs o7
Aim.amc DzmsocRAcy; ComE, ROADS TO A NEw AmE.ICA; LEaNER, IT Is LAT n THAN
You THINK; MANN, THE COMING IVICTORY OF DEmociAcy; RAPPArw, THE COasis or
DEMocRAcy.
2. Substantially the same economic point of view is forcefully put in RoGEs'
CA~r Jmism IN CRIsrs, and AN EcoNouic PRoGRAM FoR Au cmci: DmocnAcy, by
GinmER and others.
3. P. 328.
4. The term is used by Hansen, and in this review, as equivalent of the word
"capital." Pp. 126-127; 268-269.
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capital expenditure, and the availability of funds with which to finance it.
Expected conditions of cost and price measure the profit that can be antici-
pated from the use of new durable goods and thus the demand for investible
funds. These factors also influence the availability of funds for capital ex-
penditure, by altering the propensity of the public to save, and prevailing
rates of interest. Banking and financial laws and institutions, of course, also
affect the availability of funds for investment, by controlling the machinery
of banking and of security flotation, and the ability of corporations to set
aside funds for capital expenditure. There seems to be nothing mystical
or automatic about fluctuations in expenditure for capital goods; both booms
and slumps are caused, aggravated, and cured by governmental policy as well
as by business action. The first article of Professor -ansen's politics is that
in order to minimize unemployment and to offset fluctuations in trade govern-
ment must act to maintain and increase the amount of capital expenditure
made by the community.
Of all the techniques available to a democratic government for fulfilling
such a policy, Professor Hansen finds government spending the most practical
and the most promising. In effect he recommends that the government never
balance its budget. The pill is sweetened a little. A separate budget should
be established for the investment activities of the government, perhaps on
the Swedish model.5 But in the end people must recognize the fact that
investment expenditure by the government, whether called pump-priming or
a less alarming name, is the only effective weapon against depressions available
to capitalist and democratic governments. Furthermore, such expenditure, or a
modification of it, will probably continue on a large scale in periods of re-
covery, as a device for insuring and regularizing the expansion of physical
output that measures welfare.
The quality of our recent economic history makes a permanent expansion
of investment expenditure by the government almost inevitable, if full recovery
is ever to be achieved and maintained. Pump-priming undertaken by business
interests, and privately financed, has almost disappeared. But full employment
has always depended on pump-priming. In the nineteenth century, boonis
followed the speculative expenditure of private funds on railway building,
subsidized by federal land grants and other gratuities. I-Igh levels of employ-
ment during the twenties were supported, as Hansen points out,0 by great
outlays for residential building, for public works and for foreign trade, as
well as by the creation of several new industries. This decade, however, has
found nothing but the government deficit to replace the more familiar and
respectable pump-priming of earlier periods. Business expenditure for capital
goods rose during the recovery of 1937, it is true, in proportion to the general
rise in income. But such careful expenditure for replacement and expansion
followed the rise in income, and did not lead it. Mass expenditure is needed
to increase the national income sharply. So far in this decade such expenditure
has been made only via government spending for relief, for armaments or
for public works.
5. Pp, 324-325. See Myrdal, That Wonderful Swedish Budget (Sept. 1938) FonTtNn
65; Wigforss, Financial Policy During Depression and Boom (May, 1938) ANNALS 26.
6. Ch. xviii, "Pump-Priming," New and Old, p. 290 ff.
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If any lesson of the Great Depression is clear, it is that expenditure by
the government for houses or hospitals is not less useful or less stimulating
to business than comparable expenditure by private groups. Hansen empha-
sizes the importance of seeing to it that government funds are well spent,
on projects which seem worth what they cost. Government expenditure of
this type is more than a device for engineering recovery, especially if it is
designed to stimulate spending by business; it adds directly to the real income
of the community, as well as to its money income. It serves to increase mass
consumption and mass welfare.
Of course the need for investment undertaken at the initiative of government
would be reduced if investment by business would or could revive on a suffi-
cient scale. But both luck and the structure of economic institutions seem
likely to oppose any great revival of private pump-priming in the near future.
Important capital consuming inventions have not appeared in fifteen years
or more. With the end of immigration and the spread of birth control, the
rate of population growth has declined sharply. Foreign trade, despite the
energy and relative success of Secretary Hull, offers no outlet for invest-
ment on the scale required to support a boom. And the ossification of the
price system tends to restrict even the amount of investment that business
makes in response to government spending. Some of these factors of inflexi-
bility and stagnation can be opposed directly, others must be offset by com-
pensatory governmental action, if full recovery is to be achieved.
A program of investment, whether sponsored by tie government or by
private groups, is not enough to assure full recovery. Though full recovery
should be easier to reach in a period of expansion supported by government
expenditure, a successful program of recovery, Professor Hansen argues,
requires that something be done about the decline of competition, the force
for stagnation more nearly susceptible of control than the others. "The great
danger in an enlarged program of public investment is that we are likely to
rely too exclusively on it alone. If we are not constantly awake to the urgent
necessity of achieving a balance in the cost-price-income structure, we shall
greatly intensify our problem by choking off otherwise available private in-
vestment outlets . . .Above all it is of the utmost importance to break
through the frozen structure of administered prices and preferential inter-
corporate reciprocity (so inimical to price competition) in order that technical
progress may have free play to tap an ever-widening circle of consumer
demand, and thereby enable us to maintain a workable economy.
7 
. . . If
private capitalism cannot solve its price problem, it will inevitably dig its
own grave." s The conclusion is strongly urged that the problem must be
solved by making prices lower and more flexible, with a view to forcing costs
as low as possible. Prices in general, he contends, should be responsive to
competition, wages to the control of a mature system of collective bargaining,
interest charges to direct action by governmental bodies.2
Hansen does not expressly indicate his choice of sides in the controversy
about how to achieve price flexibility. In view of his position at large,
7. Pp. 327-328.
8. P. 301.
9. Pp. 286-287, 328.
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however, there is little doubt that he would probably vote with most of his
generation of economists for a price policy of modernized, imaginative and
energetic trust-busting.' 0 Against this view that the best available policy for
competition is to make it as competitive as possible, Burns and others contend
that "attempts to restore competitive behavior by law offer no prospect for
dealing with the developing element of monopolistic control in industry.""1
The conflict of counsel before the Temporary Economic Committee dramatizes
the issue. Definite answers, if they are ever to be made, require both further
study and further experiments in reforming and enforcing the laws and legal
arrangements which affect competition. Meanwhile Hansen puts the case for
lowered costs, and, by implication at least, for more competition.
Hansen's treatment of the price problem is the least developed part of
his argument. His emphasis is on the central importance of monetary policy
and government expenditure for bringing about and maintaining recovery.
Wage policy, tariff policy, price policy, these and other branches of an
economic program are in his view of vital importance, but to supplement and
effectuate-and not to oppose-a primary policy of direct expansion. Thus
he devotes two lucid chapters to the administration of social security funds,
concluding that the present federal machinery operates as a deflationary drag
on the economic system. He analyzes "the utter fallacy" 12 of the philosophy
behind the N.R.A., and considers the government's disastrous monetary policy
of 1937, which probably initiated and certainly prolonged the recession of
1937-1938. But in the argument of his book these matters are in a sense
collateral. He is concerned with the ultimate question which economists must
face-perhaps the only question worth asking them, in this tenth year of
depression: can anything be done to make capitalist democracy work? His
answer is forceful and affirmative, and it represents the view of a wide bloc
of economic opinion. The key to it is an emphasis on the crucial importance
of direct action to put men to work creating and accumulating capital re-
sources.
13
The work of Millis and Montgomery deals with the same problems of
economic welfare, but in a different perspective, on a different scale, and with
less striking success. Their two big, closely printed volumes purport to be
comprehensive surveys of most of the current literature bearing on a great
variety of labor problems. They have the heavy-footed quality of textbooks,
10. See ROGERS, CAPITALISM IN CRISIS (1938) ch. 2; Mason, Slichter, Gideonse, and
others, in Monopoly and Competition in Industry and Labor (1939) 18 AcAD. OF PoL. Sci.
PROC. 123 ff.; Watkins, The Monopoly Investigation (1939) 28 YALE REV. 323; Fetter,
Planning for Totalitarian Monopol, (1937) 45 J. PoL. EcoN. 95.
11. BURNS, TxrE DEcLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) 526; cf. DENISO, and GALBRAITH,
MODERN COMPETITION AND BusINEss PoLIcy (1938) Pp. 79-85.
12. P. 287.
13. Hansen sees no economic reason for general pessimism about the future: "It is
a mistake to assume, as some have, that public investment necessarily foreshadows the
doom of private enterprise. Indeed, if reasonably full employment can, by these and
other measures, be' maintained, private investment outlets, while relatively smaller in
relation to the total economy, may well grow absolutely. We may thus learn that there
is nothing incompatible between the survival of private capitalism and a generous admix-
ture of public investment." P. 329.
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and something of the textbook's fear of exposing definite opinions, but there
can be no doubt of their utility in collecting and reviewing a considerable
share of the recent work about labor done by economists, statisticians and
lawyers.
The plan of Volume I, primarily the responsibility of Professor Mont-
gomery, is to consider whether the purchasing power of worker incomes has
decreased or increased in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; how workers
have fared in comparison with other economic classes; why changes occur
in real wages, and in the shares of the classes in the national income; and,
finally, whether the prevailing and prospective standard of wages is socially
adequate.1
4
The premise of Hansen's book is that important progress in the elimination
of poverty can come only through increases in output-full and steady em-
ployment of resources, a high rate of capital accumulation, low prices and
costs. Hansen concludes that unions function as factors of stability in the social
and economic system,'5 not with notable success as agencies for substantially
improving the condition of the working classes. Insofar as wages are high
and rigid, he finds them as inimical to the expansion of output as high prices
for commodities.
At a less critical and sophisticated level, Professor Montgomery's book
represents the same point of view and advances the same conclusion. During
the last century there has been, he shows, a steady increase in the purchasing
power of the working classes. He finds the main factor in that advance to
be the increasing productivity of labor, that is, the increased ability of labor
to produce goods and services. Such increases in the capacity of labor to
produce result primarily from the increased use of capital goods in the pro-
cesses of production."0
If the accumulation of capital is the major force operating to increase the
real income of the community-of labor and of other groups as well-what
is the effect of unionism and wage regulation on the welfare of the working
classes? The authors defer to their forthcoming third volume a full inquiry
into the economics of unionism. They will there consider the effect of unionism
on the size of the national income, and the efficaqy of union organization as
a device for increasing labor's share of the national income. But in Professor
Montgomery's discussion of wage theory, in Volume I, he takes the view that
at most periods of the trade cycle increases in money wages reduce employ-
mentY7 And he necessarily agrees with Douglas' conclusion 8 that unionism
can increase the reward of labor, and has so increased labor's reward, to a
narrowly limited extent, and then only in the early stages of a union's history,
although it may later serve to preserve existing wage rates against reduction.
Wage regulation, he finds, may be defended as a device for eliminating sub-
standard wages.' 9 His position as to the desirability and effectiveness of wage
14. THE EcNomrics OF LAwOR, Vol. I, pp. 41-43.
15. "A country that does not have well established industrial relations based on
responsible unionism is sitting on a volcano." P. 328.
16. Vol. I, pp. 206 ff.
17. Vol. I, pp. 181-198; p. 507.
18. Vol. I, pp. 212 ff; and see p. 194, n. 1.
19. Vol. I, Ch. vi, and p. 375.
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regulation in general is somewhat obscure, but it seems fair to read the
chapter as conceding the weaknesses of the doctrine that higher wages expand
employment by increasing "purchasing power."
20
The second volume, written primarily by Professor Millis, seems less
adequate and less imaginative than the first. Its topic is labor's risks and
social insurance, and it starts with a survey of unemployment, as the chief of
such risks. The analysis of what causes unemployment, especially the three
meager pages on trade cycles, is a good deal more blurred, and less up-to-date,
than the economic passages of Volume I. Professor Millis considers (and
strongly approves) two classes of remedy for unemployment - public works
and relief spending on the one hand, and social insurance on the other.2 '
Professor Millis' discussion of social insurance laws, both in the United
States and abroad, seems factually accurate, and reviews encyclopedically the
arguments for and against most of the devices used in such insurance. But
the conclusions reached will be attacked in many particulars, especially in their
reference to the economic problems implicit in such legislation and its admin-
istration. The authors accept, for example, the payroll tax as the principal
method of financing unemployment and old age insurance. They disapprove of
substantial contributions by the government either for old age or for unein-
ployment insurance, but favor such contributions for health insurance. And
their analysis of the problem of reserves is limited in scope and inconclusive.
Social insurance has become a major concern of government, and a major
problem of economic policy. Until our system of social insurance is adequately
organized, financed and administered the job of planning and reforming the
social insurance laws must actively worry lawyers, economists and public
officials. Professor Millis' volume collects some of the materials which any-
one approaching the job needs for background, but it breaks no path toward
a solution.
EtrGENE V. RosTow'f
GOVERNMIENT CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL FUNDS. By John McDiarmid.
Introduction by Marshall E. Dimock. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. 1938. Pp. xx, 244. $2.50.
WIEN government enters the field of commercial enterprise and statesmen
choose as an administrative vehicle the corporate form of organization, con-
flicting desiderata produce grave problems for the student and technician of
public administration. Public enterprise is inherently different from other types
of government activity. If the use of the corporation has any justification. it
lies in the freedom of its directors, in matters of detailed policy, organization,
personnel, and finance, to conduct its operations with that flexibility and
resourcefulness which are expected of the best private entrepreneurs. Yet
20. See esp. pp. 182, n. 1, 375, 507-508. Cf. pp. 356-358. See note 12, supra.
21. The discussion extends to workmen's compensation and health insurance as well
as to unemployment and old age insurance.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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public enterprise is also inherently different from its private counterpart. It is
a product of public policy and must remain subject to the guidance and control
of those who are responsible for formulating public policy. Within, the frame-
work of our federal system, public corporations must observe constitutional
limitations on delegation of legislative power. They deal with public funds
and must handle them with care. They are expected to maintain minimum
personnel standards. Above all, they must function in the light of day and be
accountable to their parent, the government (whether or not it is the sole or
majority shareholder, and hence the legal owner,), to a far greater degree than
most large business corporations are accountable to their stocldolders. Control
has a twro-fold aspect: it must prevent financial corruption and administrative
malfeasance, and it must lay down and supervise the broad lines of policy.
Desirability of freedom to be enterprising does not eliminate the obligation
to remain public. A balance must somewhere be struck between these objec-
tives. It is evident that government activity of this nature, if it is to be effi-
cient, warrants greater freedom than traditional administrative agencies. Suc-
cessive Presidents and Congresses have recognized this need by establishing
since the turn of the century almost two score public corporations for carrying
on semi-commercial or commercial operations, and their action has been
paralleled in Great Britain and the British Dominions and on the European
continent in a host of cases." The precise limits of freedom in each case, how-
ever, and the machinery of control, have been determined largely by accident.
It is only in very recent years that students, here and abroad, have sought to
draw from the large and growing experience some rational guide to adminis-
trative organization and procedure for government commercial activity.
To this search for administrative principle .Mr. McDiarmid has made a
valuable contribution. Under the guidance of Professor Dimock (now of the
Department of Labor), whose case studies on the Panama Railroad Company
and Inland Waterways Corporation have made him a leading authority in the
field, he has focussed his attention on a single and central aspect of the problem,
the conditions surrounding the use of government funds by federal business
corporations. His book is well organized. After a chapter on the broad issue
of financial freedom and a sketch of the origins, organization, and powers of
each of the twentieth century specimens, he treats of sources of funds in
general and then deals in turn with the group of agencies supervised by the
Farm Credit Administration, with the Tennessee Valley Authority, and with
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Other -New Deal corporations are
handled more briefly. The book's usefulness is enhanced by a short summary
at the close of each chapter.
The core of this study is the problem of financial control to prevent cor-
ruption. 'Mr. AMcDiarmid is at his best when dealing with the often difficult
relationships between the various corporations and the General Accounting
Office under the leadership of General McCarl. He brings together and un-
ravels a mass of complex material from published and unpublished decisions of
the Comptroller-General and from cumbrous and ambiguous statutes and execu-
1. It is interesting to note that National Socialist Germany and the Labor Govern-
ment in 'ew Zealand are almost alone in restoring to direct departmental management
public businesses previously operated by government corpirations.
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tive orders, resolving them into an orderly pattern as lucid as the material per-
mits. His best chapter, on the T.V.A., tells in hitherto unrevealed detail of the
historic quarrel between the authority and General McCarl's office. It is a
tale of fundamental conflict between men anxious to show that public enter-
prise can successfully "go places and do things" and a man to whom the rigid
rules of accountability, excellent in their place to prevent peculation by un-
hurried bureaucrats in old-established routines, must also be applicable to
the Authority--"applicable first because they are applicable, and applicable
secondly because they are good and wholesome." The lesson is amply proved
by Mr. McDiarmid-that some alternative control mechanism must be sought.
His conclusions in this connection deserve serious consideration. They favor
continuous internal preaudit (comptrolling) by officers within each corpora-
tion itself, and a periodic efficiency audit by specially qualified outsiders (on
the model of F.C.A. supervision of its subsidiary corporations), who might
make recommendations to Congress, or in any case regular post-audits either
by a reorganized General Accounting Office without comptrolling functions
or some other agency free from the traditions of rigid insistence on legalistic
formalism built up by that Office under General McCarl.
Like many monographs written with Ph.D. requirements in mind, this work
is weakest in what it omits. The student in search of a degree all too fre-
quently leans over backward to force out irrelevancies, to confine his study
to a given discipline, a given topic, and a given aspect of that topic, no matter
how intertwined in reality is his object of devotion with the material excluded.
Something of that sort seems to have happened here. For example, in con-
sidering the question of sources of funds, Mr. McDiarmid twice lists a group
of a priori objections to annual appropriations (pp. 53 and 215), including
the danger of "political interference in the details of administration." We
are told that the T.V.A., the outstanding example of a government corporation
thus financed, "has had little difficulty in securing funds and in remaining
free from congressional interference in management matters." Yet there is
in fact ample evidence of attempts to hamstring the Authority through cur-
tailment of appropriations, attempts which were successful both last year and
this. Analysis of this issue with the same skill with which Mr. McDiarmid
handled the quarrel with General McCarl would have been welcome.
Two important economic problems are also passed over far too lightly. The
author disposes of the much mooted question of government guaranty of
public corporation bonds on very dubious (or at least very arguable) grounds
(p. 66). He forgets that the consideration of efficiency depends upon the
corporation being otherwise completely self-sustaining, that savings in interest
may convert a doubtful risk into certain economic success (this factor is fre-
quently the chief ground for the adoption of public rather than private enter-
prise), and that the alleged compensatory reduction in general government
credit is extremely questionable. How far government guaranty impairs cor-
porate freedom depends upon the precise conditions of control which accom-
pany it. Mr. McDiarmid also assumes too unhesitatingly the desirability of
letting government corporations use surplus earnings for capital expansion.
If the principle of the undistributed surplus tax has some justification as a
means of preventing private corporate managers from guiding the flow of
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investment without recourse to an outside check (whether it be the free
capital market or Congressional policy), this consideration may also apply
to public corporations. The point at least deserves treatment.
Finally, one might hope from the title for some discussion of the broad
issue of standards for the supply and use of funds as a matter of policy. The
Farm Credit Administration suggests a type of intermediate machinery be-
tveen Congress and the operating corporations which might aid in formulating
such standards. It could assist the overworked legislators in their proper task
of broad guidance while insulating the corporations from political interference
in the worse sense. Realistic treatment of public administration demands con-
sideration of political issues as well as of administrative controls to prevent
corruption. Mr. ,%cDiarmid treats the latter so competently that the reader
is necessarily disappointed by his choice not to deal with the former.
LiXCOLx GornoNf
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
THE AmDINISTRATIVE PROCESS (Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence, Yale
School of Law, January, 1938). By James l. Landis. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1938. Pp. 160. $2.00.
Revie-wed b Thomas T. Cooke *f
Tnuis series of lectures by Dean Landis of the Harvard Law School pleads
the case of the administrative tribunal as an "instrument of public power."
The author necessarily argues that the administrative tribunal, combining tile
functions of accuser and prosecutor with those of a judge and jury, to which
the former are fundamentally antagonistic, must be widely employed in these
fields to replace prosecution by the Executive, adjudication by the Courts,'
and to a great extent policymaking by the Congress.
One of Dean Landis's chief merits is his candor in readily conceding what
has often been concealed by apologists for the administrative tribunal, to wit,
tInstructor in Government, Harvard University.
*These lectures have been the subject of extended comment elsewhere ly students of
government. The following reviews represent the views of members of the Bar who have
practiced before the administrative tribunals.-(ED.)
tMember of the New York Bar.
1. As Chief justice Hughes has well said [Address before Federal Bar Association,
1931]:
"The power of administrative bodies to make findings of fact which may
be treated as conclusive, if there is evidence both ways, is a power of
enormous consequence. An unscrupulous administrator might be tempted to
say, 'let me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little who
lays down the general principles'."
Compare his statement in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 57 (1932) that "finality
as to facts becomes in effect finality in law."
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that it is a fourth branch of government in that it exercises all three of the
great powers of government-legislative, executive and judicial. He minces
no words, therefore, in asserting that the proper function of an administrative
tribunal of the type of the Securities and Exchange Commission (as con-
trasted with the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade
Commission which are concerned with industry as a whole) is not merely
to correct particular abuses but is to govern a particular industry. On the
other hand, as might be expected from the emphasis on efficiency, it is apparent
from these lectures that Dean Landis takes very lightly the widespread criti-
cism of the administrative tribunal as violating first principles of justice in
combining in one body the accusing, prosecuting and judicial functions.
Dean Landis's basic premise is the "inadequacy of a simple tripartite form
of government to deal with modern problems". (p. 1). Legislatures are in-
sufficiently compact, are not in permanent session, are unable to deal effectively
with multitudinous and shifting factual situations, and their policies and ob-
jectives as contained in statutes are too often inadequately expressed by reason
of the inevitable compromises required. Judges, especially those appointed
for life, have an antiquated viewpoint and do not sufficiently sympathise with
such modern legislative objectives as the rigid control of business enterprise
in the alleged interest of the public; they are unable to specialize and become
expert in narrow fields, cannot make independent investigations but must
decide upon the record made by private parties, and have so much else to
do that they cannot with expedition handle the cases in a particular specialized
field. Judges, furthermore, have not the power (considered necessary to the
effective realization of industrial control) to make rules and regulations to
implement statutes which contain only very general policies and standards,
Although your reviewer does not believe that the courts could not be ade-
quately implemented to handle effectively much of the work of a judicial
nature now being performed by administrative tribunals, or subordinate
employees thereof, most critics of the administrative tribunals do not insist
that their judicial functions be placed in the existing courts. They merely
insist, in the interest of obtaining reasonably unbiased arbiters, on the elemen-
tary precaution that the accusing and prosecuting and the judicial functions
respectively shall be exercised by persons not under a common control. A
separation such as obtains in the case of the Treasury Department and the
Board of Tax Appeals, though not ideal, has escaped the very great criticism
of such administrative tribunals as the National Labor Relations Board, There
would, of course, be no objection to the administrative "judges" and the
administrative accusers and prosecutors confining themselves to a few special-
ized fields so that the necessary expertness could be obtained. Although a
large part of Dean Landis's argument is based upon the unwisdom of leaving
enforcement to private initiative, as the only alternative to the administrative
tribunal, nothing remains of the point when a public accusing and prosecuting
agency is established. With administrative "judges" and administrative ac-
cusers and prosecutors, newly appointed for relatively short terms, the "anti-
quated viewpoint" argument for whatever it is worth, disappears. Of course,
the independent accusing and prosecuting agencies could make rules and
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regulations and do the necessary independent investigation, subject to the
acceptance thereof by the adninistrative bodies exercising the quasi-judicial
function. With such a procedure, acceptance of the substantial evidence rule
in subsequent judicial review would have far greater support in reason.
It is true that by the proposed separation of the accusing and prosecuting
functions from the judicial functions something would be lost which for reasons
of elementary justice ought to be lost. but which is vital in Dean Landis's
scheme of things. For it is a scheme which puts all its emphasis upon the
importance of the rounding out of vaguely formulated legislative policies by
administrative tribunals with decided views of their own, and the effective
enforcement of this substitute for legislative policy in the management of
industry, but which deemphasizes the concept of justice to individuals in
particular controversies.
Although Dean Landis speaks at length of the inability of the courts to
supply the necessary remedial sanctions for the effective realization of "gov-
ernmental" policy, is it not plain that with a sufficient number of specialized
courts or administrative "judges" and specialized public accusing and prose-
cuting agencies there would be little difficulty in imposing most of the sanctions
now employed by the administrative tribunals ? The real difference in method
does not so much inhere in a difference betveen the nature of judicial and
administrative remedies or sanctions. It lies in the means of determining
whether these remedies or sanctions ought to be imposed, and the method of
the administrative tribunal is certainly unjustified in the light of our firmly-
established conceptions of justice. For the administrative tribunal, which both
initiates the proceeding and prosecutes it, becomes, by reason of its judicial
powers, a judge in its own cause, a result which has been condemned from
time out of mind.
As Dean Landis concedes, the very initiation of a complaint frequently if
not usually does great harm to the defendant. No administrative tribunal can
afford to admit that it has unjustly initiated complaints in any substantial
number of cases. It must, therefore, in order to preserve its reputation, con-
vict with regularity those against whom it has initiated complaints. Nor can
one be accused of undue scepticism who is unwilling to believe what is assumed
by Dean Landis-that uniform care by government agencies in the investiga-
tion of complaints will greatly minimize this danger. (pp. 94-95). Over-
zealous belief in the policy of the statute being administered, - common to some
of the most prominent of the administrative agencies, undoubtedly arises in
large part from constant exercise of the functions of searching out violations
and thereafter prosecuting the complaints.
The sacrifice of justice. in particular cases is "justified" by the alleged
necessity of "positive solutions" in connection with social and economic prob-
lems of the day. So urgent, it is claimed, is the necessity in these connections
that Dean Landis cries down the "passive adjudication" of the courts, as
distinguished from the active adjudication of the administrative tribunals.
2. Or what is assumed to be the policy. E.g.. does not the National Labor Relations
Board assume that its duty or privilege is to advance the cause of unionism, not merely
to protect freedom of association among employees?
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(p. 20). But however great the necessities of enforcing "governmental"
policies directed to social and economic ends, it can hardly be argued that
the necessities are greater than the necessity of enforcing the criminal law.
Yet no one has suggested that accusation, prosecution and adjudication in
criminal cases be blended in one tribunal. To assimilate, as the author does,
the obtaining of pleas of guilty by a public prosecutor to the functioning of
an administrative tribunal is without justification. (p. 107). The former, unlike
the latter, must rely upon the inherent appeal of his case to third parties
without interest in its result and does not prosecute with the left hand while
holding in the right hand the absolute power to convict.
For reasons of state derived from the exigencies of sovereign government
the courts have traditionally accorded great freedom of action to the Executive
power when engaged in such activities as the collection of taxes and the expul-
sion of'those alleged to be aliens. Summary, and hence necessarily arbitrary,
methods, have, it must be admitted, been judicially sanctioned. In other less
exigent fields, however, the rise of democracy has resulted, to a greater or
less degree, in the doing away with such summary and arbitrary metiods.
Apparently Dean Landis would reverse the process in broad fields wherein
social and economic legislation operates. He speaks of the fact that it has
been customary to regard those alleged to be aliens as possessing no right,
but merely privileges. (p. 93). May it not well be asked whether it is not the
essence of Dean Landis's argument that the businessman be placed in a
similar position by according great freedom of action to the administrative
tribunals which can accuse, prosecute and condenin him without effective
review by any impartial tribunal?
In the light of current judicial failure to restrict in any substantial degree
the disposition of public moneys, the only substantial check remaining upon
the redistribution of wealth by taxation would appear to be at the ballot box.
It is apparently Dean Landis's argument that this ought to be the only real
check upon the control of our economic life by administrative tribunals, despite
the fact that the members thereof are not elected officials, for his suggestions
with respect to the existence of other checks can hardly be taken very seri-
ously. (pp. 98 et seq.).
Dean Landis not only defends the combination of the essentially antagonistic
functions of accuser, prosecutor and judge in the administrative tribunal, but
seemingly argues for a doctrine which could easily result in vast extensions
of power for such tribunals. The making of rules and regulations is not to
be confined to the mere filling in of the details pursuant to reasonably definite
policies and standards laid down in the statute. The administrative tribunal
is to "catch and feel the pace of the galvanic current that sweeps through the
statute as a whole" (p. 67), as evidenced by the preamble and the vague and
general policies set forth in the body of the statute, it is to niake all "rules
and regulations" it conceives necessary to effectuate the broad policy thus
arrived at. Indeed, those who aspire to become effective administrative officials
are warned against paying too much attention to the statute, and it is even
suggested by the Dean that one of the best administrators he has ever known




Although it is currently suspected, and not without reason, that at least
one of the most prominent of the recently created administrative tribunals
habitually employs the process of having subordinates comb through the recordl
in order to find evidence to support predetermined findings, and although
Dean Landis admits that the members of administrative tribunals by reason
of lack of "time and opportunity" customarily delegate their judicial duties
to subordinates (p. 105) who are, by and large, not overly competent *(pp.
104-5), he deplores the fact that the courts, although accepting the findings
of administrative tribunals upon ordinary facts if sustained by substantial
evidence, will not permit their findings upon jurisdictional and constitutional
facts to become final if against the weight of the evidence. H-e incorrectly
paraphrases the Federal Constitution which he says "expressly makes findings
of fact by a jury of inexperienced laymen, if supported by substantial evidence,
conclusive" (p. 125) and is claimed to prohibit the giving of the same effect
to findings of fact made by "a highly trained and especially qualified admin-
istrative agency." (p. 125). In fact, the Federal Constitution merely provides
(Seventh Amendment) that in suits at common law "no fact tried by a jury.
shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law", and in criminal cases that the accused
shall enjoy the right to a trial by an "impartial jury" (Sixth Amendment).
Under these provisions the Federal courts have had no difficulty in holding
that jury verdicts may be set aside when clearly insupportable by the required
weight of the evidence. Nor is it easy to find any reason (except the extremely
poor one from the standpoint of justice that the adoption of a contrary rule
would swamp the courts as presently manned) why the findings of an admin-
istrative tribunal deciding upon its own case, even if actually made by itself
and not by unauthorized and inexperienced subordinates, should have any
greater weight than those of a competent and experienced equity judge who
somehow finds the "time and opportunity" personally to hear all the witnesses
in the case even if it takes months of his time, and whose findings are review-
able on appeal as to the weight of the evidence.
Perhaps therefore in fashioning new "instruments of public power" to deal
with modem problems your reviewer may be excused for preferring less of
the alleged expertness and "efficiency" of the administrative tribunal, with its
indefensible combination of powers, and more of the simple justice and wise
restraint inherent in the constitutional concept of the separation of powers-
especially as efficient realization of such governmental policies as have been
actually authorized by the elected representatives of the people may be at-
tained without the sacrifice of these vital qualities.
Reviewed by George Yebolsinet
AN IMPORTANT obstacle to the understanding of the administrative process
is the unbridged chasm between Administrative Law theory and the practical
workings of administrative bodies. The greater part of the learned writings
t~ember of the New York Bar; Lecturer, Yale Law Sclool.
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on Administrative Law focuses attention upon the treatment of the orders of
administrative bodies by the courts without touching the momentous and
seldom reviewed run-of-the-mill practice arising before these important bodies.
One of the reasons for this lack of correlation is the exceedingly rapid growth,
both in number and importance, of administrative agencies, which has pro-
jected the administrative process in the last few years from the relatively
narrow fields of utility and fiscal regulation and the control of aliens into
the almost limitless fields of agriculture, manufacturing, distribution and
finance.
A splendid effort to overtake and to subdue to analysis some of the numerous
empirical developments in administrative practice is contained in the Storrs
Lectures, delivered at the Yale Law School by the former Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Dean Landis. These Lectures, now
published, constitute an unpretentious work, comprising some 160 pages. But
their content is of great significance to administrators, practising lawyers and
teachers alike, for they contain a fresh and spirited analysis of current admin-
istrative techniques and a thoughtful discussion of many of the author's own
experiences as an administrator.
Dean Landis' stress upon the task confronting the administrator in doing
a job efficiently focuses attention upon the techniques available to the admiin-
istrator. His expositions of how practical problems, presented to the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the administration of the many Acts assigned
to it, were met, is the unique contribution of this work. He also brings his
experience to bear in recommendations for the protection of the administrative
process from the destructive forces that endanger it. Two of these are: too
broad a statutory discretion in the Act setting up such an agency, which
invariably subjects it to the play of almost irresistible political and economic
pressures in the formulation of its policies, and excessive rigidity and timidity
in routine staff administration of an Act.
The work should be read by all students of the administrative process. It
should be of great help to administrators in illustrating how action can be taken
by an imaginative use of the tools provided in the statutes; it should be of
interest to practising lawyers in providing an insight into an enlightened
administrator's mental processes; it should also be of value to the academic
world in hastening a change in teaching method in Administrative Law, away
from the reconciliation of court decisions bearing upon the powers of admin-
istrative bodies to a study of the techniques employed by administrative agen-
cies and their fitness to serve the ends sought.
The author views with unbounded confidence the utility of the administra-
tive process in dealing with problems of governmental regulation of various
types of business activity. Such a point of view comes with entirely good
grace from Dean Landis. If more administrators had his record of construc-
tive and intelligent administration, no one would question it. But enthusiasm
must be tempered by a realization that our administrative agencies, in the
long run, will be operated by people of average ability, and many of the
fears expressed by members of the legal profession with respect to the use




On this practical plane it may be suggested that a fuller exposition of
different methods of formal and informal fact finding is desirable. There is,
unfortunately, a residuum of resistance on the part of administrative officials
to checking technical information and facts with outside experts, be these
facts used in connection with the formulation of broad policy or the drafting
of rules and regulations. Effective techniques for achieving greater coopera-
tion between those charged with the responsibility of administering regulatory
statutes and outside experts are needed.
No reader of the work can escape the conclusion that the administrative
process makes enormous demands upon the administrator. Sound legal crafts-
manship alone on the part of administrators is not sufficient. Executive ability
and an intimate knowledge of the business regulated are essential. Since the
great majority of administrators are lawyers, a heavy responsibility devolves
upon our law schools to keep their training in line with the requirements of
this growing branch of law.
THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISm. By Jane Perry Clark. New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1938. Pp. xviii, 347.
T3ais is that best of all statements of a problem - the kind that points the
way to further and vital research. Professor Clark has investigated, as care-
fully as illuminatingly, the way in which the states have been led to coopera-
tion with the federal government by the problems of recent years. Her
discussion covers a wide area. Cooperative research, the exchange of per-
sonnel, the loan of federal funds, grants-in-aid, the operation of statutes like
the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, the checks and controls upon the rela-
tions of the two sorts of government - these are samples only of the material
she surveys. It is not easy in any brief way to summarise her results. It is
clear that the volume of cooperation is far wider, and also more intense, than
the student is normally led to imagine. It is clear, also, that the stage is set
for a continuing, if not orderly, growth of the process she describes. The
picture is one of an emerging pattern of relations which may well, as Professor
Clark has seen, develop, in time, a new federalism in which the central govern-
ment becomes something like the guardian of standards in areas of activity
in large part administered by local governments. What seems to be developing,
largely through the device of the grant-in-aid, is an area of decentralization
in which the state is nothing so much as the agent of the central government.
The likeness of this pattern, in the broad, to the relation of local and central
government in Great Britain is not the least interesting of the results that
emerge from Professor Clark's analysis.
It is difficult to praise too highly the zeal and accuracy which have gone
into the compilation of this account; certainly there exists no better survey
of the important theme involved. But, perhaps rightly, Professor Clark has
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scrupulously refrained from any discussion of the tendencies she has analysed.
She is content to dwell upon the major administrative consequences of the
relation - leaving a judgment upon their value to the reader. She retails
the advantages and disadvantages of the scheme as it has developed; she does
not judge them. Looking at the pattern as a whole, one is tempted above all
to emphasize what Professor Clark herself calls its "haphazard and unplanned"
nature. Important though the cooperation is, it rarely touches those areas in
which the problems of federalism are likely to be of decisive importance.
Taxation, commerce, agriculture, labour standards, education, in these, at
least, there is either. little cooperation, or, alternatively, little clear direction
about the purposes involved. There is little realization of the degree to which
the issues a government must face need to be tackled on a single plane. There
is still a good deal of jealousy, the danger of grave corruption, even consti-
tutional limitations to be overcome. There is the thorny question of how far
the federal grant-in-aid breaks down the initiative of the state-government.
There is the complicated problem of the very different standards at which
the performance of the work is secured in states which approach so differently
all the issues involved in the subject-matter of cooperation. There is the
pressure involved on the budgets of different states in their effort to earn
the grants the federal government is prepared to bestow. There is the danger,
even, that federal entrance into a particular field may actually discourage a
state government from the proper performance of an important function.
The impression Professor Clark's valuable summary of the evidence seems
to imply is twofold. On the one hand, the problem is one of time; on the
other, it is a problem of the quality of personnel. Granted the range and
intensity of the issues involved, it seems at least dubious whether the scale of
the problems now confronted by the United States leaves the division of
functions a satisfactory one. This is especially the case in financial terms.
The cost of modern services is so great that many of the states, granted their
taxable resources, can hardly well afford them. To provide them on a proper
scale, may well mean power without effective responsibility in the coming
years, if the federal government is to sponsor the due payment of funds
without full control over their expenditure. The fact, moreover, that in so
many states the work depends upon officials who owe their posts to the spoils
system makes a continuing maintenance of adequate standards of admiinis-
tration both delicate and complicated; and that the more since, in such
circumstances, the subject-matter of cooperation is far more likely to be the
victim of pressure groups; this has, for example, been true of electric power
projects in many areas of the United States. The machinery of cooperation
is, further, excessively complicated; and to work with reasonable smoothness
it almost certainly requires the delegation of quasi-legislative powers to the
executive which it is doubtful whether Congress or the state legislatures
would be willing to grant, even if the Supreme Court were prepared to allow
them to do so. What, in fact, is at bottom involved is the immense issue of
whether the technique of federalism is suited to the government of the United
States in the age of giant industry and the problems to which it gives rise.
Not unnaturally, Professor Clark has hinted at, rather than dealt with, so
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momentous a problem. It is, however, implied in every page of her book.
Until it is faced, discussion of such details as she makes is of fascinating
interest. But it is conducted upon a plane where, from the angle of the next
generation, it cannot help appearing a little like a performance of Hamlet
without the Prince.
HAROLD J. Lsxi f
Seattle, Wash.
tProfessor of Political Science, Unive'-sity of London.
ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE, BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEA\S AND ASSiZF-S
FOR YORKSHIRE Ix 3 HENRY III (1218-19). Edited for the Selden Society
by Doris lary Stenton. London: Bernard Quaritch, 1937. Pp. Ivi, 540.
FROM the eyre of 1218-19 there survive only the roll of pleas and assizes
heard at Lincoln, printed in volume 53 of the Selden Society's publications,1
and the three Yorkshire rolls which form the subject of the present book.
Though they are of independent importance as the most complete record we
possess of judicial business in the shires during that critical year, the chief
reason for making these rather than other evre rolls available is the fact that
cases from them were cited by Bracton in his treatise, and they thus form
a minor but not unimportant source of the Dc Legibus. Contrary to the con-
temporary Lincolnshire roll, and that of Worcestershire for 1221, the York-
shire rolls do not bear Bracton's characteristic markings, though it is not
due to this that the majority of the cases cited from them cannot be identi-
fied, but rather to the incomplete form in which the roll of civil pleas has
survived. The record of crown pleas, on the other hand, is complete, and
presents the only existing evidence of the actual way in which the first itiner-
ant justices who visited the shires carried out the Council's instructions in
regard to suspected criminals who would have been sent to the ordeal had
it not been forbidden by the Lateran Council of 1215. The third roll printed
is a memoranda roll on which were noted matters requiring further thought
or action, and the facts of those cases which were adjourned to Westminster
for judgment. This throws valuable light upon the jurisdiction of justices
itinerant by illustrating matters they considered to be beyond their inimedi-
ate competence. In general, cases adjourned to Westminster were postponed
either because the parties were persons of position or because semi-political
issues were involved, though an occasional intricate case clearly demarded
further counsel.
Unfortunately, little insight into Bracton's method is to be gained from
the present volume. The cases cited in his treatise which can now be identi-
1. ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE, BEING THE RoLLs OF PLEAS AiD AssizF.; y e
LINcoLxsHIRE 1218-19 AND WORCESTERSHIRE 12-1 (Selden Society, 1934). See Wo\.d-
bine, Book Review (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1284.
1939]
934 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol, 48
fled on the rolls, though interesting to see in their setting among the pleas
that were passed over, are not of particular importance and are too few to
permit any adequate reconstruction of the plan which prompted Bracton's
selection. Though this is disappointing, the rolls nevertheless present a good
number of interesting cases, both civil and criminal, to which attention should
be called but upon which it is quite impossible to comment here.
The three rolls have been edited with the utmost care and precision and
provided with an illuminating introduction. They are published in a most
attractive form. Legal historians will be grateful to both the Selden Society
and its editor for making them available.
S. E. TiIORNn t
Chicago, Ill.
t Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
